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“Between the Human and Brutal Creation”:  
Posthuman Agency and the Samuel Frost Corpus
Erin E. Forbes
University of Wyoming
Every genuine author, in a greater or less degree, leaves in his works, whatever 
their design, traces of his personal character: elements of his immortal being. 
— Rufus Griswold, “The Death of Edgar A. Poe”1
The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles.
— Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?”2
On a summer evening in 1793, a half moon midway on its journey across the 
sky became visible in the Massachusetts twilight. Samuel Frost had escaped by 
day on the 16th of July. He hid in the underbrush just outside of town, haunted, 
perhaps, by two ghosts. Ten years before, Frost had murdered his father by 
smashing his head in with a lever, and earlier that day he killed his employer, 
Elisha Allen. Re- creating the murder of his father, Frost beat Allen’s brains out 
with a garden hoe. According to the documents that would be printed in the 
days and months to come, this young man, like the moon in the sky that night, 
was only half- formed. An unusual creature, neither man nor animal, Frost rep-
resented, in the words of three broadsides, “the connecting grade between the 
human and brutal creation.”3 Frost was apprehended after a few days, on July 
20th. In 1783, he had been acquitted of his father’s murder on grounds of insan-
ity, but his murder of Allen produced the death sentence. On All Hallows Eve 
in 1793, Samuel Frost died at a public hanging in Worcester. 
We know all of this because a small but fascinating array of printed materi-
als relating to Frost remains in existence, in archives both physical and digi-
tal.4 The Frost archive comprises an execution sermon preached just before his 
hanging and published as a pamphlet shortly after; several brief, syndicated 
newspaper articles; four broadsides (two offered for sale on execution day) 
that include various combinations of a third- person account of Frost, his last 
words or “dying” confession, and a poem reflecting on the “solemn occasion” 
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of Frost’s execution; and advertisements for these broadsides (see Fig. 1). These 
publications fit seamlessly into the American gallows print tradition. From the 
first publication of a North American execution sermon in 1674 to the rise of 
the popular press in the nineteenth century, readers in the colonies and the 
new nation consumed hundreds of books, pamphlets, broadsides, and poems 
describing the lives (and often the deaths) of convicted criminals.5 In the late 
eighteenth century, as Karen Halttunen has demonstrated, such texts increas-
ingly described criminals as animal or otherwise inhuman, just as they do in 
Frost’s case.6
If the publications surrounding Frost are consistent with the historical devel-
opment of the American gallows print tradition, Frost’s life is likewise legible 
in relation to the social configurations of the emerging liberal state.7 Frost was 
a dispossessed young man, who may also have suffered from what we would 
today call a neurodevelopmental disability. Although it may be tempting to 
read Frost as a forgotten iteration of the remarkable American individual (some 
lost, dark avatar of Benjamin Franklin), in fact Frost was one of many who were 
constitutively excluded from liberal citizenship.8 As Immanuel Wallerstein has 
argued, “the other face of the inclusiveness of citizenship was exclusion,” be-
cause from its very beginnings the liberal state has denied active citizenship to 
those deemed as lacking in virtue and/or intellectual capacity.9 Since the late 
Fig. 1: Advertisement, The Federal Spy and Springfield Advertiser I, no. 47 (5 No-
vember 1793), 3, col. 3. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.
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eighteenth century, the list of those excluded has comprised not only criminals 
and people with disabilities, like Frost, but also slaves, women, animals, and, 
closer to our own time, detainees like those held at Guantanamo.10 
A major aim of much historically oriented scholarship in the past several 
decades has been to restore humanity to the dispossessed by retroactively re-
incorporating those who were excluded into the realm of the liberal humanist 
subject.11 Such work has often taken the form of excavating instances of indi-
vidual agency: as Walter Johnson has argued, history approached “from the 
bottom up” has become problematically “compressed into the impulse to ‘give 
them back their agency.’”12 It is not my intention to deny or minimize the strug-
gles and successes of those on the margin who did achieve some measure of 
liberal agency, or of the scholars who have directed our attention to them.13 Yet, 
there are countless others, like Frost, who did not seek or achieve such agency, 
nor pave the way for others to do so. What might we discover if we attend more 
carefully to cases like Frost’s? And, just as importantly, how do we account for 
the lives of those who have been excluded from liberal society without retain-
ing its terms of valuation, without conjuring the specter of individual agency?14
In what follows, I offer a provisional answer by analyzing Frost’s life and 
deeds as they appear when assembled with the late eighteenth- century print 
culture that represented, judged, aestheticized, or moralized on that life and 
those deeds. I call this assemblage of man and media, which blurs the onto-
logical bounds of the human and non- human, the Samuel Frost “corpus.”15 My 
first epigraph helps to clarify what it might mean to read Frost as “corpus.” 
Although phrases like “genuine author” and “immortal being” at first glance 
imply a liberal framework that would separate art from embodied experience, 
in fact Rufus Griswold posited a deep interconnection of the material and the 
immaterial, print, and person. In this unsympathetic obituary, Griswold aimed 
to traduce his rival Edgar Allan Poe by intimately connecting Poe with his dark 
works. While Griswold’s motivations here may have been self- serving, his sug-
gestion that there is a constitutive interrelation among art, action, and person-
hood is illuminating. Though Frost, unlike Poe, may never have put pen to 
paper, I read Frost as a “genuine author” who quite literally left himself in his 
works. Griswold’s qualifying phrase, “whatever their design,” suggests that 
these works that retain traces of their creator need not be poems or paintings: 
they may instead be deeds, perhaps even extreme actions like murder. 
A reading of Frost as corpus incorporates this insight by bringing text and 
human action into the same plane of analysis, rather than approaching Frost as 
purely textual (which would vest agency in the critic as the producer of mean-
ing and elide any historical Frost), or looking to the historical record to establish 
the contours of Frost’s authentic existence (and thereby ground claims for his 
individual agency).16 Moving through close readings of Frost’s execution ser-
mon, broadsides, execution poem, and the newspaper coverage of his trial and 
hanging, we can see Frost’s “personal character” and “immortal being” in the 
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interrelation of his works: his murder of Allen and of his own father, his escape 
and confession, and the print culture to which these actions gave rise. Impor-
tantly, the documents I consider here, as well as the man they represent, are 
conflicted and contradictory: in the execution sermon, Aaron Bancroft depicts 
Frost as execrable, but elsewhere Frost appears oddly sympathetic, and even 
capable of radical empathy, as when the “Account of Samuel Frost” explains 
that he was found banging his head against the prison wall in order to under-
stand how his victims felt in their final moments. When we look at these publi-
cations in tandem with one another and with the man they represent, a unified 
Frost— real or imagined— does not emerge. Instead, the Frost corpus as a whole 
explodes the ideal of autonomous agency through its own contradictions.17 
As I have indicated, Frost’s murders coincided with the ascendancy of 
liberal humanism, which was consolidated as the basis of U. S. identity and 
citizenship in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yet the Frost 
corpus undermines liberalism’s fundamental premise, that agency and human-
ity are coextensive.18 Countering the liberal view of agency as enacted by an 
individual, abstract, “human” self, man- media assemblages such as the Frost 
corpus display an agency is that simultaneously voluntaristic, collective, and 
material, arising from the interweaving of human actors with texts.19 The net-
worked agency of the Frost corpus is therefore not human, but posthuman in 
the sense outlined by Cary Wolfe.20 It collapses “the fantasies of disembodiment 
and autonomy, inherited from humanism.”21 Rather than redeeming Frost from 
characterizations of him as inhuman through a heroic critical intervention that 
would somehow restore his status as a liberal agent, I trace the potentialities 
and possibilities of posthuman agency in the Samuel Frost corpus.22 
“WITH BECOMING DETESTATION”: LIBERALISM’S DISGUST
In his 1793 execution sermon for Frost, Bancroft encouraged his audience to 
feel disgust for this “pest of society.”23 In the sermon, a liberal understanding 
of humanity is predicated on the exclusion of criminals like Frost as inhuman, 
and therefore outside the community. The liberalism of Bancroft’s execution 
sermon was consistent with a late eighteenth- century shift toward conceiving 
of criminality as a nonhuman subjectivity, a shift enacted largely via print.24 
The earliest examples of colonial execution sermons presented a Calvinistic 
view of criminality as the result of a divine retraction of restraining grace. By 
the 1790s, however, the criminal represented in these sermons metamorphosed 
from an ordinary sinner into a creature at once powerfully other and decidedly 
man- made.25 Late eighteenth- century execution sermons displayed humanist, 
Enlightenment concerns and convictions as readily as they evinced the theo-
logical underpinnings of earlier sermons. A tale of individual self- fashioning 
replaced the traditional drama about the fate of the criminal’s soul. Thus, as one 
might expect from a religious form with increasingly secular content, Bancroft’s 
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execution sermon was an internally conflicted document. In form and function 
it was very much in line with earlier execution sermons, yet whereas earlier 
American execution sermons centered on the condemned’s soul, Bancroft’s fo-
cused on the making of the liberal subject, and did so precisely through its 
concurrent construction of the nonhuman. 
Bancroft’s theme was not only how Frost turned into the kind of creature 
who could commit the crime of murder, but also how his audience might make 
themselves differently.26 Attention to the titles of execution sermons underscores 
this shift. Where early execution sermons were given titles like Speedy Repentance 
Urged (1690, Cotton Mather), The Folly of Sinning, Opened & Applyed (1699, In-
crease Mather), and Death the Certain Wages of Sin (1701, John Rogers), Bancroft’s 
1793 sermon was titled The Importance of a Religious Education Illustrated and En-
forced (see Fig. 2).27 Similar in length and size to these precursors, Bancroft’s ser-
mon was printed and sold as a twenty- four- page pamphlet. Unlike many earlier 
execution sermons, however, Bancroft’s text does not discuss Christ and the peni-
tent thief, nor does it draw on salvationist language from the Books of Job or Isa-
iah. He reads instead from I Samuel 3:13, “His sons made themselves vile, and he 
restrained them not.” There were some later execution sermons, particularly after 
the Second Great Awakening, that continued the earlier tradition’s emphasis on 
the criminal as representative of the miraculous possibility of divine mercy. But 
Bancroft’s sermon, in its aim of exhorting good parenting through sound secular 
and religious training, participated instead in the period’s widespread emphasis 
on the importance of education and care for youth.28
Working within the generic conventions of the American execution sermon, 
Bancroft goes through the list of “gateway” sins that might have set Frost on the 
slippery slope toward murder, only to conclude that this traditional explana-
tion could not account for Frost’s inhumanity:
He never mixed in those scenes of intemperance and dissipation, which frequently 
corrupt the moral powers of men. . . . [T]he temptations of ambition and avarice 
had no influence; yet in a country, where all men enjoy those advantages for moral 
and religious improvement . . . we behold him a savage, possessed of the most 
malignant and revengeful passions.29
Minor sins did not set Frost up for a later fall. Rather, those sins were conspicu-
ously absent. Frost was figured here not as a human who erred as any of us 
might, but as “a savage, possessed of the most malignant . . . passions.” In the 
newly formed United States, he had access to “advantages for moral and reli-
gious improvement,” but to no avail.
Rather than the standard explanations for crime in the early American 
gallows tradition, Bancroft drew on a secular mode of personal history to ac-
count for how Frost, whom he characterizes as a “pest,” came to infect society. 
Though reluctant “to open the graves of the dead, and to expose to publick 
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view the faults of those who have passed,” Bancroft nevertheless said that “the 
father of this unhappy man was greatly deficient. . . . [T]he example set before 
him was impious, cruel, and barbarous. In this school the son was but too ready 
to learn.”30 (Note that Bancroft nowhere acknowledges the fact that Frost had 
murdered his father, an omission I will discuss later.) The word of God recedes 
as Bancroft applied his “doctrine” from the First Book of Samuel to Samuel 
Frost, an example of the results of bad parenting,
Fig. 2: Aaron Bancroft, The Importance of a Religious Education Illustrated and 
Enforced, title page (Worcester, 1793). Courtesy of the American Antiquarian 
Society.
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a striking instance of the fatal effects of the neglect of early education. . . . We be-
hold a human being, apparently devoid of all social affection and sense of moral 
obligation . . . [who] is now with ignominy to lose his life, as a pest of society.31
Applying a Lockean paradigm to Frost’s upbringing, Bancroft stressed the im-
portance of the strong, unshakeable influence of early impressions on the mind 
of the child, which take hold before reasoning capacity is fully formed.32 
In Bancroft’s sermon, we see that Frost appears as one who failed to make 
himself what Bruno Latour calls a “fragile and precious thing,” a modern 
human.33 Yet as Latour points out, the nonhuman emerged in tandem with the 
human: “modernity is often defined in terms of humanism, either as a way 
of saluting the birth of ‘man’ or as a way of announcing his death. But this 
habit . . . overlooks the simultaneous birth of ‘nonhumanity’— things, or ob-
jects, or beasts— and the equally strange beginning of a crossed- out God, rel-
egated to the sidelines.”34 Bancroft constructed the specter of inhumanity from 
the events of Frost’s life, not in order to save souls but to inspire the success-
ful self- fashioning of the liberal subject. Telling his audience to “aspire to the 
true dignity of your natures,” he encouraged them to distance themselves from 
Frost by cultivating feelings of disgust for him, which placed Frost outside the 
“human” sphere of rights- based belonging.35 Instead of offering Frost spiritual 
counsel, Bancroft praised his audience for reviling Frost: “with becoming de-
testation and abhorrence, you contemplate the action which brought him to 
this untimely end.”36 He figured this disgust as attractive or “becoming” of his 
auditors: 
Were you thought capable of his crime, you would exclaim, “Are we dogs, that 
we should do this thing?” We believe you incapable of the crime of murder. . . . 
The path of honour and distinction in this world lies before you, to animate your 
minds to virtuous pursuits.37
Bancroft lauded the imaginative limits that prevented his audience from ques-
tioning their own humanity (“Are we dogs?”). Though “we” are not dogs, Frost 
implicitly is. In this separation of human from inhuman enacted via the mate-
rial, spoken, and print medium of the execution sermon, we see liberalism in 
the making. 
Yet at just this moment, we can also locate the potential of the posthuman. 
When he finally addressed Frost directly, Bancroft retained his larger emphasis 
on self- making: “You are to be taken away from among the living, because you 
have made yourself vile, and are become unworthy longer to be a member of 
the community.”38 Insofar as he has “made [himself] vile,” Frost enabled Ban-
croft’s audience to become properly human by cultivating disgust for those 
like him. Criminals like Frost are part of what must be excluded to shore up a 
rights- based polity, in which humanity itself is something to which one aspires 
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(“aspire to the true dignity of your natures”).39 The antinomies of the liberal 
worldview thus created a new kind of criminal, one who, through an alchemy 
of environment and volition, emerges as something neither human nor inhu-
man. When the “natural” becomes aspirational, and disgust becomes an admi-
rable affect, the criminal, we might say, is un- self- fashioned. 
Without doubt, Bancroft’s sermon objectified Frost: but, as we will see, it 
is precisely through these inhuman and material qualities that Frost and the 
corpus as a whole (including the sermon) attains agency. In contrast to the ab-
stractions of liberal agency, which posit a freedom based on a human univer-
sality that is unmoored from the particularities of lived experience (such as 
race, gender, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and disability), the posthuman 
agency of the Samuel Frost corpus is embodied and particularized.40 Attempt-
ing to “restore humanity” to a figure like Frost would have the effect of effacing 
the space between human and nonhuman that liberalism itself has constructed. 
And it is precisely from this space that the Frost broadsides generate forms of 
connection and belonging that are not predicated on exclusion, abstraction or 
transcendence.
“TO KNOW HOW THEY FELT”:  
RADICAL AFFECT IN THE FROST BROADSIDES
The Frost broadsides encourage a more direct engagement with Frost’s very 
strangeness, in contrast to Bancroft’s disgust. As a form of connection that dis-
avows itself, disgust is an affect useful for cultivating liberalism’s exclusive, 
rights- based modes of citizenship and belonging. Yet at the same time, the 
experience of disgust is predicated on the most visceral forms of connection, 
whether a bad taste on the tongue or a monster in our midst.41 Thus it is un-
surprising that the Frost corpus’s ability to engage readers is not limited to 
disgust. When we look at Frost’s dying confession or at the “Account of Samuel 
Frost” published alongside it, we find an intricate imaginative economy of af-
fect, which Bancroft’s staid injunction of abhorrence does not erase but in fact 
enables.42 And this is not in spite of, but rather through descriptions of Frost’s 
savage inhumanity. Affective engagement increases in proportion to Frost’s 
monstrosity, as readers find themselves drawn to this more- than- human being 
that exists “between the human and brutal creation.” 
Each of the Frost broadsides found a market in those attempting to digest 
this life, which appears by turns fascinating and repellent. Isaiah Thomas 
printed the first, The Confession and Dying Words of Samuel Frost, in Worcester 
(see Fig. 3). It was sold on execution day, along with a separate broadside, also 
printed by Thomas, which contained “A Poem on the Execution of Samuel 
Frost” (see Fig. 4). Both of these execution day broadsides contained the same 
woodcut engraving, which showed a man hanging from a gallows in front of a 
large crowd. An official with a gun stands in the foreground on a horse- drawn 
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death cart, and men with guns seem to surround the crowd from behind. The 
two subsequent variations of this broadside reprinted the same confession and 
“Account of Samuel Frost,” and also included the poem. One also gave the 
poem a different title, “A Poem on the Solemn Occasion.” Sold by Jonathan 
Plummer, a traveling trader, Last Words and Dying Confession of Samuel Frost 
was printed in Boston, most likely by E. Russell.43 It contained eight woodcut 
engravings, making it the most visually arresting of the broadsides, as well as 
a brief description of Frost’s behavior at the execution itself in the lower right 
corner (see Fig. 5). The other post- execution broadside, printed by Henry Blake 
Fig. 3: Samuel Frost et al., The Confession and Dying Words of Samuel Frost 
(Worcester, October 1793). Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.
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Fig. 4: “A Poem on the Execution of Samuel Frost” (Worcester, 1793). Courtesy 
of the American Antiquarian Society.
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& Co. in Keene, N. H., used the same titles as the execution day broadsides, 
though with different line breaks for the poem, and it contained no engravings 
(see Fig. 6). On each the typography is dynamic, with many words appearing 
either bolded, capitalized, in italics, or various combinations thereof. Sensa-
tional language is accompanied by accusing manicules, an admonitory skull 
Fig. 5: Samuel Frost et al., Words and Dying Confession of Samuel Frost (Boston, 
1793). Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.
23824.TX_ECTI_TheoryInterp_57_1.indd   49 2/19/16   1:05 PM
50 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Fig. 6: Samuel Frost et al., The Confession and Dying Words of Samuel Frost (Keene, 
1793). Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.
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and crossbones, exclamation points, and gallows scenes. Exerting a material 
agency, such typography encouraged readers to imagine the man and events 
presented as similarly captivating.44 Even the headline of the relatively spare 
Keene broadside (Fig. 6) offers a good example of this dynamism, in its combi-
nation of all capitals, boldface type, and italicization.
Print documents like these broadsides, which include first- person state-
ments “taken from the mouth” of criminals condemned to execution, many of 
whom could not write, had a history stretching back nearly as far as execution 
sermons.45 The early eighteenth century saw an increased interest in the crimi-
nal’s voice; by the mid- eighteenth century, dying- words broadsides had largely 
replaced an earlier genre of criminal conversion narratives and pious confes-
sions. In older confessions, a third- person commentator often offered a sketch 
of the final moments of the condemned, and an evaluation of the likelihood that 
the malefactor had reached heaven. In these broadsides, an anonymous “Ac-
count of Samuel Frost” functioned as a sort of gloss to the confession, an almost 
social- scientific apparatus that might help readers assess Frost’s multiple, con-
tradictory aspects. Late eighteenth- century confessions were often more sen-
sational than their predecessors, offered more explicit details about the crime, 
and, in line with liberalism’s emphasis on the individual, were increasingly 
concerned with unusual “characters” rather than an archetypal sinner.46 
The broadsides containing Frost’s confession and the "Account of Samuel 
Frost” were no exception to this trend. The sensationalism of these broadsides 
manifested not only via typography, but also through their foregrounding of a 
set of concerns, including radical, anti- patriarchal violence, which linked Frost 
to the larger revolutionary Atlantic world. In the confession, Frost suggested 
that Allen’s murder is justified by his de facto enslavement to Allen:
I went off several times . . . but did not get any thing by going away but a flogging 
when I returned. Considering myself as a slave, I have thought I had as well die as 
live as I did.— I had a small estate and wanted to work on that, but I could not— Mr. 
Allen had the care of my estate, and I supposed was paid for my living with him out 
of it. I thought several times I would kill him, and then thought I would not. 
After being acquitted of his father’s murder in 1783, Frost lived with a series of 
men until, in 1786, he “went and lived with Capt. Elisha Allen, who took me in 
because it was the desire of a number of people.” Frost saw himself as Allen’s 
slave because Allen did not allow Frost to come and go as he pleased. Allen 
subjected Frost’s body to punishment while compelling him to work on his land, 
even though, Frost supposed, the expenses Allen incurred by having taken Frost 
in were paid out of Frost’s own estate. For these reasons, the “Account of Sam-
uel Frost” indicated, “he thought it no great crime to kill such as he supposed 
treated him very ill.” Like so many in the late eighteenth century, Frost saw his 
violent acts as being in accordance with a revolutionary ethic of justice.
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In 1793, the year Frost murdered Allen, the French and Haitian revolutions 
gathered momentum, with Louis XVI executed in January and slavery abol-
ished in Haiti later that year. These currents are clearly on display in Frost’s 
confession, with its emphasis on enslavement as a justification for violence and 
its own local history of revolt. Western Massachusetts had witnessed Shays’ Re-
bellion in 1786–87. In his confession Frost details his decision to join, and sub-
sequently abandon the Shaysites, many of whom were war veterans, in their 
march to oppose the state government by stopping the court at Worcester.47 
Frost went with the rebels “as far as Holden— at this place, stopping at Davis’s 
tavern, I went out to pick some apples to eat; after which I laid down on the 
ground and went to sleep— when I awoke, I thought I was doing wrong to go 
with those people to stop the Court, and would not go with them any further.”48 
Although Frost chose not to pursue economic justice alongside these revolu-
tionaries, in the Confession he sought to justify his murder of Allen on the basis 
of economic and personal oppression at Allen’s hands. And it is the same court 
at Worcester that would ultimately sentence Frost to die for this crime.
The solar calendar in the 1793 Worcester Almanack, which, like the first Frost 
broadside, was printed by Thomas, further connects Frost to revolutionary sen-
sibilities through its references to the French Revolution (see Fig. 7). Frost mur-
dered Allen on July 16th, 1793. The Almanack enthusiastically marks July 14th 
as the fourth anniversary of “the glorious revolution in France,” and marks 
July 16th with “Ça Ira! Ça Ira! Ça Ira!”49 Translating roughly to “It’ll Be Okay,” 
“Ça Ira!,” the most popular song of the French Revolution, expressed violently 
democratic sentiment: “Ah! ça ira, ça ira, ça ira, / les aristocrates on les pendra! / Le 
despotisme expirera / La liberté triomphera” (“Oh. It’ll be okay, be okay, be okay, / 
The aristocrats, we’ll hang ’em all. / Despotism will breathe its last, / Liberty 
will take the day”).50 The revolutionary atmosphere was palpable and influ-
enced not only Frost’s murders but also the affective responses they generated. 
In addition to his murder of Allen, a patriarchal guardian figure, Frost was also 
guilty of literal patricide. Ten years before his murder of Allen, he murdered 
his father.51 The Frost broadsides make much of this, with a manicule at the top 
of the Boston version (Fig. 5) emphasizing the fact front and center. Frost com-
mitted this “shocking Crime” at a time when Britain had been styled (by Thomas 
Paine and others) as the “bad” parent from which a now- grown America had 
righteously severed itself. We might reasonably speculate that, three short 
years after General Charles Cornwallis’s surrender, Frost was acquitted partly 
on the basis of this larger political and military landscape of the 1780s. But, with 
the ongoing violence threatened by the Shaysites and others, the escalation of 
events in Haiti and France, and the move toward a stronger centralized gov-
ernment in the United States between 1784 and 1793, his murder of a second 
patriarchal figure, Allen, produced the sentence of death. 
Yet even in this more conservative political climate, it is easy to imagine 
that there would have been many who continued to sympathize with Frost in 
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Fig. 7: Thomas’s Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Newhampshire & Ver-
mont almanack, with an ephemeris, for the year of our Lord 1793 (Worcester, 1792). 
Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.
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opposition to patriarchy. This is especially apparent in the broadsides. Frost 
begins his confession with a brief personal history and genealogy of his liv-
ing and dead relations, and relates that while laboring beside his father ten 
years before, “I knocked him down with a handspike, and then beat his brains 
out,” because of his ill- treatment of Frost’s mother. Frost’s direct ownership of 
these deeds and his radical claim that he murdered Allen because he saw him-
self as enslaved are the most voluntaristic moments in the Frost corpus. Unlike 
the broadsides, Bancroft’s sermon avoids the potentially dangerous idea that 
Frost’s crimes may have been motivated by anti- patriarchal impulses.52 Ban-
croft’s aim is to separate Frost from the community through disgust, and so he 
studiously avoids connecting Frost to the revolutionary narrative that would 
have been entirely apparent to his audience.53 By contrast, while the broadsides 
do not redeem Frost’s humanity, they do suggest that these murders are, at 
least in part, a result of a radical struggle for some more equitable mode of 
belonging.
Importantly, the basis of this belonging is both material and affective. The 
broadsides represent Frost’s actions as unnervingly consistent not only with 
a radical, violent politics but also with an enumeration of Frost’s own valua-
tion of honesty and attempts at sympathy. Inhuman and cold- hearted, Frost in 
the “Account” nevertheless expresses an uncanny desire to share his victims’ 
experiences:
He told some persons who visited him one day, that he believed his father and 
Allen had a very tough time of it— Being asked why he thought so, he said he had 
been beating his head against the walls of the prison, in order to know how they 
felt whilst he was killing them.
Frost demonstrates here a startling capacity for intersubjective imagination. In 
beating his head against the prison wall in order to occupy the position of his 
victims, Frost channels liberal moral philosophers of his day like Adam Smith, 
who argued that since we “have no immediate experience of what other men 
feel,” the only way to have an idea of how others are affected is “by bringing 
the case home to [one]self.”54 Taking this idea to an extreme of literality, Frost 
reminds readers that he is a body to be punished as much as a mind to be 
puzzled over. Indeed we see in Frost’s actions an implicit revision of Smith. 
Unlike Smith’s liberal abstractions, the theory of sympathy suggested in the 
Frost corpus suggests the necessity of embodiment for intersubjective imagina-
tion.55 Frost’s visceral display insists on sympathetic connection as an embod-
ied phenomenon.
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“LAUNCHED INTO ETERNITY”:  
ART, CRIME, AND THE COLLECTIVE
In banging his head against the prison walls, Frost illustrates that embodiment 
is necessary to generate the affective connections that ground community. 
Around the same time, Immanuel Kant was developing a metaphysical system 
in which the materiality inherent in embodiment likewise informed what he 
called sensus communis (common sense), the basis for which was the aesthetic.56 
Most critical discussion of the aesthetic since has emphasized transcendence 
and purity. But for Kant and other late eighteenth-century thinkers, the aes-
thetic assures connection between man and the world he perceives: it forges 
connections via materiality, between human and nonhuman bodies.57 Like 
those excluded from liberalism’s abstract modes of belonging, the aesthetic in 
late eighteenth- century philosophy also occupied the space between human 
and nonhuman. It thus should not be a surprise that in the execution poem for 
Frost, we see a modern view of the criminal as artist or genius, whose agency 
emerges out of and exceeds the exclusions of liberalism.58 In this final section, I 
show how the very inhumanity that Bancroft constructs in his sermon merges 
with the aesthetic in the execution poem for Frost.59 
This thirty- eight- line poem, entitled “A Poem on the Execution of Samuel 
Frost,” was printed and offered for sale as a separate broadside on execution 
day, and later appended to the two post- execution broadside editions of the 
account and confession.60 It begins with an injunction very much in line with 
an older model of gallows literature: “Learn to be wise from others harms, / And 
you shall do full well.”61 Highly moralistic, the theme is virtue rewarded and vice 
punished, as the poem’s quotation from Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man (1734) 
“That virtue only, is our bliss below” indicates. The poem suggests that Frost, 
“At once the traitor and the patricide,” is being executed not only for murdering 
his “patron” Allen, but also as punishment for the murder of his father. These 
rhymed pentameter couplets depict Frost as having counterfeited insanity in 
order to escape punishment for that initial crime of patricide:
Yet here his art eluded justice’ claim,
He knew the maniac or the fool to feign,
Impos’d on candor, with a vague pretence,
And mercy wink’d upon the black offence.
In suggesting that the court itself fell victim to Frost’s “art,” this poem perhaps 
suggests that poetry may be more potent than law. More broadly, the poem 
reinscribes a more traditional perspective on crime in its emphasis on Frost’s 
guilt. But it offers a crucial and eminently modern twist: Frost is not just guilty, 
but artful. Through an aesthetic performance, feigning the maniac or the fool, 
he slips between the cracks of human justice. 
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The poem works to correct this loophole, and hold Frost fully to account. 
Like older gallows publications, it attempts to repurpose Frost’s act as a spe-
cifically moral lesson. Unlike the warnings of an earlier period, however, the 
slippery- slope moral as applied to Frost’s case is nonsensical:
Ye Youth who view the sadly solemn scene,
Learn hence the laws of virtue to esteem,
Learn hence that he who from his duty swerves
Will one day meet the vengeance he deserves:
Ne’er let the flowery paths of vice delude,
Nor let revenge upon your thoughts intrude.
Wayward youth ought to take care, the poem suggests, lest they be tempted 
onto the path of viciousness and wind up on the gallows. Yet Frost had not 
followed any “flowery paths of vice”— drinking, lust, lying, or any of the “gate-
way” sins of traditional gallows literature. In Frost’s case, the temptation the 
poem warns against is nothing less extreme than parricide itself, since this is 
the very first act in which Frost’s own “duty swerve[d].” 
Like Bancroft’s sermon, then, the execution poem distinguishes Frost from 
ordinary sinners and places him beyond the pale of the human. But whereas 
the sermon makes Frost explicitly brute and inhuman, he emerges in the poem 
instead as an artist. Artful and full of “vague pretence,” he appears as a de-
ceiver uniquely guilty and incapable of being accounted for by the performance 
of older execution rituals and publications. The inhuman space created for a 
criminal like Frost in Bancroft’s sermon reappears in the poem as the more ca-
pacious, mediated space of the aesthetic. In the sermon Frost is included in 
an emerging liberal society as who, or what, is excluded.62 He is the figure of 
negative personhood by which members of this society can recognize their own 
human belonging, and is bereft even of the capacity for true guilt. On this view, 
Frost’s crimes are not even crimes, but the result of deficient education and 
upbringing. In contrast, when the poem finds itself incapable of accounting for 
Frost in the terms of a society that has faded, he emerges as a posthuman agent, 
exceeding the role of excluded other to which Bancroft’s liberal stance would 
like to restrict him. Frost is guiltier than the everyday sinner, because he is re-
sponsible not only for the crimes committed, but also for the design employed 
in their execution and cover- up. Where the gambit of the sermon is to make 
Frost inhuman, the poem intensifies this maneuver: it makes him an artist. 
In a familiar modern view, the aesthetic is increasingly monumentalized in-
sofar as it withdraws from the world, and otherwise dismissed as kitsch, por-
nography, or “mass culture.”63 As Daniel A. Cohen has argued, we can trace the 
origins of American popular culture to the tradition of gallows literature. In 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the American popular press 
irresistibly performed a double abjection, of the aesthetic and of the criminal, 
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which readers both voraciously consumed and loudly disparaged. As changes 
in printing technology allowed for cheaper and more heavily illustrated repre-
sentations of the criminal, the increasingly sensationalized popular press filled 
its pages with shocking details of far more outrageous crimes than Frost’s. Sen-
sationalized confessions, criminal pamphlets, criminal biographies, and trial 
transcripts eventually came to stand in for the criminal’s fleshly body as it was 
locked within the inscrutable walls of the penitentiary.
Although Frost never experienced incarceration in a penitentiary system, exper-
iments with private punishment already were underway during his lifetime.64 Set-
ting the stage for a nearly total eclipse of the criminal’s physical body by a body of 
print, 1790s print culture had begun to contain transgressions like Frost’s in ways 
that an earlier gallows tradition never imagined.65 This historical and cultural shift 
set the stage for the emergence of the posthuman agency that I have been tracing in 
the man- media hybrid of the Frost corpus. This form of agency is evidenced most 
fully in the newspaper coverage of Frost’s crimes, trials, and, finally, his public ex-
ecution. In the pages of a 1783 issue of The Massachusetts Spy, “a person by the name 
of Samuel Frost” made his first appearance in print (see Fig. 8). This account is all 
the print world saw of Frost until his trial was briefly mentioned in The Salem Ga-
Fig. 8: “Worcester, Oct 2,” The Massachusetts Spy: Or, Worcester Gazette VIII, no. 
649 (2 October 1783): 3, col. 4. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.
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zette and The Vermont Gazette in May of 1784: “Samuel Frost, a minor, for the mur-
der of his father. The jury after being together eighteen hours, acquited [sic] him on 
account of Insanity.”66 Judging from the “Account” and from the much more wide-
spread newspaper coverage of Frost’s 1793 murder trial, there seems to have been 
every opportunity for Frost to have renewed the insanity defense through which 
he was acquitted of his father’s murder in 1784. But Frost persisted in his plea of 
guilty, and, even, according to the newspaper reporting, “demanded to be hung.”67 
A number of newspapers printed one of two accounts of Frost’s 1793 trial.68 
All report Frost was indeed “a person of sufficient understanding” to be “prop-
erly guilty” (and hence executable), yet this decision stands in tension with what 
these same accounts describe as his “apparent hardened insensibility and stu-
pid indifference, which prove him destitute of every social principle, and of all 
proper sense of the enormity of the crime.”69 In keeping with the contradictions 
of liberalism, Frost’s callousness and incapacity for sociality appear in the news 
coverage as both the very reasons to execute (his indifference exacerbating the 
heinousness of his crime, a view we see in the sermon and poem) and the reasons 
to acquit once again (his inadequate understanding of wrongdoing, a view also 
put forward in the sermon). Failing to evince a full humanity, the criminal is here 
a liminal creature beholden to and produced by man rather than God, “properly 
guilty” yet “destitute of every social principle.” By insisting that he be tried and 
hanged, Frost refuses liberalism’s exclusion and claims his existence as a social 
being. Like the banging of his head against the prison wall to understand how his 
victims felt, Frost’s demand to be punished in his body, according to the letter of 
the law, was an assertion of belonging. 
But what kind of belonging? In the newspaper coverage, the fact that Frost’s 
disregard for life extends even to his own (in his demand to be hanged) is taken 
to heighten his inhumanity and affirm the propriety of his exclusion from 
liberal society, which, as Michel Foucault has pointed out, placed a premium 
on biological life.70 Frost stridently refuses to be incorporated into the liberal 
sphere as an insane person, though the newspaper coverage suggests this 
was the path he was most encouraged to take. A plea of insanity would have 
kept him alive, but also under the control of another patriarchal custodian like 
Allen.71 By contrast, the public display and punishment of his body would have 
secured him— in an earlier day— a place among a community of other sinners. 
The pre- modern community he may have been seeking to join through the ju-
dicial or religious ritual of public execution had all but disappeared by 1793. 
Instead, at the time he was tried, his crimes, execution, and the surrounding 
print materials “launch” him into a different mode of belonging: a collective, 
mediated existence that extends beyond biological death yet remains material. 
Even before he becomes a corpse, Frost becomes corpus, a body of print that 
persists to this day. By December 1793, more than half a dozen papers across 
the country had covered Frost’s execution.72 The following account appeared in 
several of these (see, for example, Fig. 9): 
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In the 30th ult, Samuel Frost was executed in Worcester, pursuant to his sentence, 
for the murder of capt. Elisha Allen, of Princeton, on the 16th day of July last. This 
man, just ten years before he murdered capt. Allen, killed his father, for which hor-
rid crime he was tried, but acquitted by the jury, who supposed him insane. Before 
execution, a sermon was preached by the rev. A. Bancroft, to a very large audience. 
The criminal was present— After which he was carried to the place of execution. 
He shewed few or no signs of penitence. On being asked by the high sheriff, if he 
wished to say any thing to the spectators, he answered, that he had not much to 
say— he would not have them follow him. The sheriff repeatedly asked him if he 
wished his execution delayed? He answered as often as asked, no! as he was to 
go (that was his expression) it had better be soon over. The scaffold dropped, and 
this uncommon murderer was launched into eternity. It is thought the number of 
spectators present, was about 2 000.73
Fig. 9: “Worcester, Nov. 6,” The Essex Journal & New Hampshire Packet no. 491 (13 
November 1793): 3, col. 3. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.
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After hearing the sermon, Frost says that he has nothing to say and indicates his 
readiness to be hanged.74 Ready “to go,” he was surrounded by a large group of 
spectators that included vendors selling copies of the first broadside containing 
his confession and the “Account” or the broadside “Poem on the Execution of 
Samuel Frost.” Frost died on October 31, but in subsequent printings of these 
broadsides, and in newspaper accounts, he survived his own death. 
By insisting on execution, or at least avoiding a verdict of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity, Frost in some degree directed his own destiny. Yet the Frost 
corpus has agency not primarily as a result of Frost’s individual will, nor solely 
as a result of the vibrant materiality of print itself, but more due to its rhe-
torical, taxonomic, historical, and imaginative existence between the human and 
the nonhuman.75 The posthuman corpus engendered by Frost and his crimes, 
together with their representations in print, is part of a still larger collective. La-
conic, impenitent, and resolute, this “uncommon murderer” met his death be-
fore a large, wondering audience whose gaping members were then extended 
geographically and temporally via imaginative engagement with a snippet of 
print, or pixels on screen. For the curious businessman a thousand miles distant 
in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1793, or for the student or scholar perusing 
the digitized Archive of Americana collection more than two hundred years later, 
the corpus can even give us some idea of Frost’s appearance. The State Gazette 
of South Carolina reported that Frost was “a short man, of a dark complection, 
short black hair . . . easily known by his constantly shrugging up his shoulders, 
stretching out his arms, and shaking his head,” while the "Account” describes 
Frost as “about five feet four inches high, rather slenderly built, and very strong. 
He had a peculiar way of tossing or twitching his head, and his countenance 
was very unpleasant.”76 The Boston broadside included a woodcut engraving 
that seems to have been meant to represent Frost (Fig. 5). These representations 
of Frost’s fleshly body, like the body of print surrounding it, offers a fascinating 
if not flattering portrait. 
The mediated collectivity of the Frost corpus would be entirely missed by a 
reading that relied on liberal norms of agency as operating directly, via inten-
tion and consciousness. Its posthuman agency exists only in the space between 
reality and representation, a space first created by and for the criminal.77 From 
certain angles of vision, the Frost corpus does exhibit individual agency. But a 
reading of the corpus that isolates these few instances— rather than reading it 
as a whole— would be limited indeed. Posthuman agency includes these volun-
taristic moments, but it is not wholly the property of the individual subject, nor 
is it primarily oppositional. Situated “between the human and brutal creation,” 
posthuman agency is, to draw again on Latour, “delegated, mediated, distrib-
uted, mandated, uttered” by assemblages like the Frost corpus.78 
Rita Felski has suggested that to regain a robust view of the aesthetic we 
need also to rethink agency: specifically she calls for recognition of texts as non-
human actors.79 My theorization of the posthuman agency of the Samuel Frost 
23824.TX_ECTI_TheoryInterp_57_1.indd   60 2/19/16   1:05 PM
FORBES—POSTHUMAN AGENCY AND THE FROST CORPUS 61
corpus, grounded on this recognition of texts as nonhuman actors, contributes 
to such a renewal of the category of the aesthetic in eighteenth- century scholar-
ship. In the literary criticism of the last few decades, much- needed attention to 
historical and cultural context has largely replaced the aesthetic object as the 
heroic (liberal) agent, while the aesthetic object in turn becomes passive and 
inert. The settlement, in which one “side” appears as fully agentic and the other 
as wholly determined, will remain intact until we revise “prevailing views 
about the heroic, self- propelling, or oppositional nature of agency.”80 Although 
Felski does not address recovery projects directly, her argument has important 
implications for such scholarship, which often retains a heroic view of agency.81 
Acknowledging this, I maintain that we can best account for Samuel Frost and 
countless other human- media assemblages of the long eighteenth century, from 
Aphra Behn to Olaudah Equiano and Nat Turner, not by recovering their au-
thentic, forgotten, or maligned voices but by literally re- membering the bodies 
of writing that sprung up in response to their lives and deeds. 
Strengthened rather than limited by its materiality, posthuman agency be-
comes most efficacious when the boundaries of the human are most unsettled. 
Today, when definitions of citizen and noncitizen, human and nonhuman— and 
the ethical obligations such definitions entail— are once again profoundly un-
settled, a posthuman understanding of agency will prove more robust than the 
liberal conceptions that have held sway. Returning to the archive to account for 
those dark figures like Frost who inhabit the antinomies of liberalism, explain-
able neither by text nor context— not nature, and not culture— we can reopen 
the possibility of a more truly inclusive polity, which was at once promised and 
foreclosed by humanism.
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17. In his preference for the term “actant” to describe the “quasi- agency” of nonhu-
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man assembalges, Latour at once acknowledges and sidelines debate about thinking 
agency only in relation to the human, or indeed, of thinking humanity only in relation 
to oppositional agency (Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor- Network Theory 
[New York, 2005], 54). As Diana Coole has noted, “Agency has been central to modern 
conceptions of politics but it is a complicated and contested idea that seems to have fallen 
into both theoretical and historical crisis” (“Rethinking Agency: A Phenomenological Ap-
proach to Embodiment and Agentic Capacities,” Political Studies 53 [2005]: 124–42, 124). 
While there has been a flurry of recent interest in how we might alter our view of agency 
in the face of contemporary challenges, my work argues for the importance of a historical 
perspective on nonhuman agencies.
18. Theorists of the posthuman have argued that the ontological and biological 
bounds that fix the human are always necessarily blurred; thus with characteristic levity, 
Latour opines: “to speak of humans and nonhumans allows only a rough approximation 
that borrows from modern philosophy the stupefying idea that there are humans and 
nonhumans” (“The Berlin Key, or How to Do Words with Things,” in Matter, Materiality 
and Modern Culture, ed. P. M. Graves- Brown [New York, 2000], 10–21, 12).
19. This approach brings print, embodied action, and larger institutional structures 
into the same nonhierarchical plane of analysis, rather than overemphasizing one at the 
expense of the others. Both White and Matt Cohen have recently argued for the neces-
sity of such a disciplinary “shift in perspective” in Early American Studies away from 
purely discursive formations. White examines backcountry cultures through the lens of 
“practical ensembles,” arguing that “eighteenth- century actors understood themselves 
as living in a society of relatively fluid collective forms, and through these local build-
ing blocks they approached those matters we more loosely capture with generalities like 
‘politics,’ ‘economy,’ or ‘culture’” (17). Elucidating complex communication networks, 
Matt Cohen argues against the ahistorical bifurcation between oral and print cultures that 
has structured much of the scholarship on early American culture, particularly in relation 
to indigenous peoples (The Networked Wilderness: Communicating in Early New England 
[Minneapolis, 2010], 2). 
20. See Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis, 2009). Both Matt Cohen and 
Stacey Margolis demonstrate the relevance of “network theory” to eighteenth-century 
America. Margolis points to Charles Brockden Brown as a preeminent example of an 
early American author explicitly invested exploring of “the hidden, widespread and 
unexpected connections that make an information society possible” (“Network Theory 
Circa 1800: Charles Brockden Brown’s Arthur Mervyn,” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 45, no. 
3 [2012]: 343–67, 344).
21. Wolfe, xv. Posthumanism, in this view, holds that the category of “the human” 
requires a simultaneous historical and conceptual construction of a nonhuman other. It 
refers to animals, subaltern humans (e.g., criminals, women, and slaves), and plants, as 
well as manmade and/or “natural” objects (e.g., newspapers and rocks). Posthumanism 
has been developed by a wide range of thinkers who do not all use the term directly, 
including Donna Haraway, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Giorgio Agamben, and 
Jacques Derrida. My perspective aligns most closely with Karen Barad’s definition of 
posthumanism as “a refusal to take the distinction between ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ for 
granted, and to found analyses on this presumably fixed and inherent set of categories” 
(Meeting the Universe Halfway [Durham, 2007], 32). 
22. Scholars attempting to incorporate the insights of posthumanist thinking into the 
study of those who have been part of marginalized identity groups necessarily face seri-
ous difficulty because of the deeply disturbing history in which members of these groups 
have been figured as nonhuman in order to justify their oppression. For a lucid analysis 
of this challenge, see Warren Liu’s discussion of the difficulty scholars of Asian Ameri-
can literature have had in articulating “a theoretical response to this [Latourian] type 
of quasi- object/subject, in which the human and the nonhuman mingle and emerge as 
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simultaneously real/natural, narrated/discursive, and collective/social” (“Posthuman 
Difference: Traveling to Utopia with Young- Hae Chang Heavy Industries,” Journal of 
Transnational American Studies 4, no. 1 [2012]: 1–23).
23. Bancroft, The Importance of a Religious Education Illustrated and Enforced (Worcester, 
1793), 17.
24. Here it is helpful to keep in mind Wolfe’s differentiation of philosophical posthu-
manism, a line of thinking that opposes the “protocols and evasions” of humanism, from 
a transhumanism that is ultimately an “intensification of humanism” associated with a 
liberal ideal of autonomous and “triumpant disembodiment” (xv–xvii).
25. Although narratives of sin and punishment remained important to crime literature 
into the early nineteenth century (and beyond), identification of individual deviance and 
explanation of its origins in the story of an individual life began to take precedence. Ex-
ecution sermons were preached either the Sunday before the execution, or on execution 
day. The criminal was usually present, and these sermons— preached by leading minis-
ters rather than, as in England, minor clergy— drew large crowds. By all accounts nearly 
as many people heard the sermon as were present at the execution itself, and these ser-
mons then were among the first to reach a more extended audience via print. See Bosco, 
“Lectures at the Pillory: The Early American Execution Sermon,” American Quarterly 30, 
vol. 3 [1978]: 156–76.
26. My reading of Bancroft’s sermon runs counter to a widespread consensus that 
execution sermons remained largely unchanged through the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. For example, both Bosco (“Lectures”) and Halttunen stress that goal of the ex-
ecution ritual was reconciliation, a healing of the fissure caused by the crime, wherein the 
criminal played the dual role of moral example and sacrificial Christ figure, putting evil 
in service of salvation (41–49). Wayne C. Minnick argues that every execution sermon at 
least implied the existence of an all- powerful God, man’s free will, the preeminence of life 
after death, and damnation for all sinners except those who repent through Jesus Christ 
(“The New England Execution Sermon, 1639–1800,” Speech Monographs 35 [1968]: 77–89, 
82). Bancroft’s sermon fits these molds only at a stretch. 
27. This embrace of liberal secularism is apparent in the titles of other later execution 
sermons, such as Warning Against Drunkenness (1816, David D. Field) and A Discourse 
(1825, Jonathan Going).
28. See Daniel A. Cohen’s discussion of Bancroft’s sermon in his explication of the grow-
ing emphasis early national ministers placed on faulty education as the source of deviance: 
“One might have expected that the case of a young man who had brutally murdered two 
of his elders would inspire a sermon arraigning the depravity and ingratitude of youth. 




32. For more on early American education more broadly, especially in relation to John 
Locke, see Gillian Brown, The Consent of the Governed: The Lockean Legacy in Early American 
Culture (Cambridge, Mass., 2001). For the role of education in relation to liberalism, see 
Wallerstein: “Liberalism . . . preached that virtue could be taught, and it therefore offered 
the managed progression of rights, the managed promotion of passive citizens to the 
status of active citizens” (147).
33. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass., 
1993), 138.
34. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 13.
35. Bancroft, 21. It is useful to recall Michel Foucault’s observation that, in the eyes of 
the state, the possibility of identification with the condemned is one of the shortcomings 
of public modes of punishment (Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison [New York, 
1995]). In the U. S., Benjamin Rush explicitly criticized public punishments because of 
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this possibility of “misplaced” identification (An Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punish-
ments upon Criminals, and Upon Society [Philadelphia, 1787]).
36. Bancroft, 20.
37. Bancroft, 20–21. Bancroft here references 1 Samuel 17:43, “And the Philistine said 
unto David, Am I a dog, that thou comest to me with staves? And the Philistine cursed 
David by his gods,” and 2 Kings 8:13, “But what, is thy servant a dog, that he should do 
this great thing?”
38. Bancroft, 23.
39. In Agamben’s terms, Frost is a figure of dehumanized “bare life” included in po-
litical life by means of exclusion (Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Dan-
iel Heller- Roazen [Stanford, 1998]). Dillon offers a particularly lucid explanation of the 
seemingly paradoxical nature of liberalism’s inclusive exclusions: “rather than simply 
standing as external to liberalism, this private position [of women]— and indeed, the en-
tire notion of privacy and private property— must be seen as crucial to the structure and 
meaning of liberalism” (3); therefore “this exclusion [of women and African Americans 
from liberalism] can be reversed in dialectical terms: that is, it is demonstrably the case 
that this exclusion includes white women and African Americans in an externalized— but 
foundational— position” (17). See also Margolis, The Public Life of Privacy in Nineteenth- 
Century American Literature (Durham, 2005).
40. For an analysis of the integral— if submerged— roles of corporeality, textuality, and 
gender in liberal theory, see Dillon, esp. 11–48.
41. Over the last decade or so, literary critics and philosophers have become increas-
ingly interested in the affect of disgust; these include Daniel Kelley and Nicolae Morar, 
“Against the Yuck Factor: On the Ideal Role of Disgust in Society,” Utilitias 26, no. 2 
(2014): 153–77; Carolyn Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust: The Foul and the Fair in Aesthetics 
(New York, 2011); Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); and William Ian 
Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).
42. On execution day, the poem was published in a separate broadside that could be 
purchased at the same time as the broadside containing the “Account” and “Confession”; 
the two subsequent Frost broadsides contained all three texts.
43. For an illuminating discussion of Jonathan Plummer’s career as an “author- peddler” 
and the audiences he reached with broadsides like Last Words and Dying Confession of Samuel 
Frost, including the young poet John Greenleaf Whittier, see Michael C. Cohen, The Social 
Lives of Poems in Nineteenth- Century America (Philadelphia, 2015), 1–39, esp. 22.
44. For a provocative analysis of the dynamic agency of typography in early American 
print culture, see Marcy J. Dinius, “‘Look!! Look!!! at This!!!!’: The Radical Typography of 
David Walker’s Appeal,” PMLA 126, no. 1 (2011): 55–72.
45. Because many criminals could not write, criminal confession as a genre troubles a 
concept closely linked to liberal concepts of agency in this period: authorship (see Daniel 
A. Cohen; and Louis P. Masur, Rites of Execution: Capital Punishment and the Transformation 
of American Culture, 1776–1865 [New York, 1989]). It seems reasonable in this case to imag-
ine that Frost did write his own confession, since the “Account of Samuel Frost” indicates 
that “he could read and write.” Yet while our ability to determine Frost’s literacy would 
be crucial for a reading of Frost as a liberal agent, it remains secondary to my theorization 
of the posthuman agency of the Frost corpus. 
46. As Daniel E. Williams writes, confessions in this period “exhibited a much greater 
concern for the imagination than they did for the conscience” (Pillars of Salt: An Anthology 
of Early American Criminal Narratives [Madison, 1993], 13).
47. I am grateful to Daniel A. Cohen for drawing my attention to Frost’s connection 
to Shays’ Rebellion. Arguing for the centrality of “backcountry” insurrections such as 
Shays’, White laments the tendency amongst historians to understand such events “as 
either localized versions of national phenomena or, worse, as so many symptoms of a 
broad unrest to be registered by the urban centers” (2). See also Robert A. Gross, ed., In 
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Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion (Charlottesville, 1993); and Leonard 
L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia, 2002).
48. Confession.
49. Thomas’s Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Newhampshire & Vermont alma-
nack, with an ephemeris, for the year of our Lord 1793 (Worcester, 1792).
50. “Ça ira,” quoted in Albert Marrin, Thomas Pine: Crusader for Liberty (New York, 
2014), 88. English translation from the American Social History Project’s Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution website (George Mason University and City 
University of New York, 2001). See also Laura Mason, Singing the French Revolution: Popu-
lar Culture and Politics, 1787–1799 (Ithaca, 1996), 34–60.
51. See Jay Fliegelman’s influential analysis of the complexities of antipatriarchal 
thought and action in a new republic founded on revolutionary ideals (Prodigals and Pil-
grims: The American Revolution against Patriarchal Authority, 1750–1800 [Cambridge, 1982]).
52. The publisher of the printed version of Bancroft’s sermon includes a footnote ex-
plaining that Frost had murdered his father (22).
53. The “Account” indicates that Frost had attended Sunday meeting twice after his 
sentence, and had been offended by the minister for mentioning his murder of his father. 
He “said he did not like to be twitted of that— that it was an old matter, and was settled 
long since.” It is possible that this minister was Bancroft, who consequently did not men-
tion this murder on execution day out of respect for Frost’s wishes. The content of the 
sermon, however— in particular, Bancroft’s disdain for Frost— suggests otherwise. Even 
if Bancroft were the minister mentioned in the “Account,” the execution sermon’s audi-
ence, whom Bancroft was at pains to distance from Frost, would have been a much larger 
crowd, and much more potentially unruly.
54. Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759], ed. Knud Haakonssen (New York, 
2002), 11–12. 
55. See Bruce Burgett’s related argument about the necessary relationship between 
embodiment and the formation of the public sphere in the late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century U. S. in Sentimental Bodies: Sex, Gender, and Citizenship in the Early Re-
public (Princeton, 1998). 
56. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment [1790], trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, 
1987), 159–62.
57. A number of late eighteenth- century thinkers readily elided any distinction be-
tween the material and the abstract. As Edward Cahill has noted, many contemporary 
writers on the aesthetic were invested in “linking the sensory perception of objects to the 
processes of association” and easily assimilated the “proximity of the material and the 
ideal” (Liberty of the Imagination: Aesthetic Theory, Literary Form, and Politics in the Early 
United States [Philadelphia, 2012], 12, 201). Paul de Man revived this integrative view: 
“the aesthetic is not a separate category but a principle of articulation between various 
known faculties, activities, and modes of cognition” (“Aesthetic Formalization: Kleist’s 
Über das Marionettentheater,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism [New York, 1984], 263–90, 
264–65).
58. The aesthetic assumes a quasi- sacred role in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, as that which bridges the otherwise irreducible divide between appearances and 
reality. Yet at the same time, art also becomes increasingly marginal to social and political 
life. As part of this process, an overdetermined liminality comes to define both the crimi-
nal and the artist (not coincidentally, as the Frost corpus will suggest) as alienated and 
abject. These dark, twinned figures are carefully excluded from the liberal realm of con-
sensus and self- governance. They emerge in tandem with, but are not reducible to, liberal 
humanism. See Agamben’s argument that the aesthetic becomes increasingly marginal 
as the “anthropological machine of humanism” grows (The Open: Man and Animal, trans. 
Kevin Attell [Stanford, 1994], 29).
59. Cahill ultimately offers a different understanding of the force of aesthetic in the 
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early U. S. Arguing for the aesthetic as a mode of theorizing most useful for those inter-
ested in consolidating an elite, Cahill demonstrates that aesthetic theory complemented 
the vision of the Federalists. Though “the political aims of Federalist criticism went 
unfulfilled [in the nineteenth century] . . . its literary aims had a significant effect on 
nineteenth- century culture” (225). Though convinced by Cahill’s argument, I am inter-
ested in an alternative tendency within the eighteenth- century discourse of the aesthetic, 
which Cahill also notes, to give rise to “collective models of subjectivity” (12).
60. In the Boston broadside, the poem is re- titled “A Poem on the solemn Occasion.”
61. “A Poem on the Execution of Samuel Frost” (Worcester, 1793). All references are 
to this edition.
62. See Agamben, The Open; Dillon; and Margolis, The Public Life of Privacy.
63. This understanding of art was most famously articulated in the work of the Frank-
furt School. See, for example, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “The Culture 
Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John 
Cumming (New York, 1990), 120–67; and Herbert Marcuse, “The Affirmative Character 
of Culture,” in Art and Liberation: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Volume 4 (New York, 
2007), 82–112.
64. Mark E. Kann has argued that a system of penitentiary punishment that denied 
liberty to a significant proportion of “citizens” on the margins became necessary in this 
period, as a solution to the problem of how to maintain order in a nation engendered by 
antipatriarchal rhetoric (Punishment, Prisons, and Patriarchy: Liberty and Power in the Early 
American Republic [New York, 2005]).
65. For a lucid analysis of the centrality of the penitentiary in nineteenth- century 
American culture, see Caleb Smith, The Prison and the American Imagination (New Haven, 
2011). Dayan’s discussion of the racial dimensions of the twenty- first-century incarcera-
tion explosion is also salient here: “the prediction for future ex- criminal disenfranchise-
ment rates suggests how black citizens in the United States, once convicted of crime, will 
be indefinitely excluded from the society in which they live” (60).
66. See The Salem Gazette III, no. 135 (11 May 1784): 2, cols. 2–3; and The Vermont Ga-
zette, or Freeman’s Depository I, no. 49 (10 May 1784): 3, col. 1.
67. The Columbian Centinel XX, no. 9 (9 October 1793): 3, col. 1. 
68. These included The Massachusetts Spy, The Daily Advertiser, The Essex Journal, and 
The New Hampshire Gazette. By September, papers carried one of two main accounts, one 
longer and one shorter. Frost’s demand of execution by hanging appeared in the shorter 
version. Newspaper coverage of Frost’s first trial was sparse by comparison. 
69. The Massachusetts Spy: Or, Worcester Gazette XXII, no. 1069 (26 September 1793): 3, 
col 3.
70. See Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979, ed. 
Michel Senellart (New York, 2008).
71. The so- called “wild- beast test,” which dated from Henry de Bracton’s thirteenth- 
century work, Of the Laws and Customs of England, had long guided application of the 
insanity defense. Bracton’s insane criminal was “not much above the beasts, who lack 
reason” (quoted in Nigel Walker, “The Insanity Defense before 1800,” in “The Insanity 
Defense,” ed. Richard Moran, special issue, Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 477 [1985]: 25–30, 28).
72. Many of these excerpted large portions of “The Account of Samuel Frost.” News-
papers covering Frost’s execution included The Massachusetts Spy, The Concord Herald, The 
Columbian Sentinel, The Independent Chronicle, The Oracle of the Day, The Essex Journal, The 
New Hampshire Journal, The Daily Advertiser, The Impartial Herald, The Weekly Register, The New 
Hampshire Gazette, and The Baltimore Daily Intelligencer.
73. “Warren, Nov. 30,” Dunlap and Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser 4583 (19 De-
cember 1793): 2, col. 3.
74. The newspaper coverage describing Frost’s behavior at his execution contrasts 
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with the brief “eyewitness” account given in column 4 of Plummer’s Boston broadside 
(see Fig. 5); here Frost reportedly says “That he would not wish YOUNG PEOPLE should follow 
his steps.” It is possible that Plummer is the author of this account of Frost’s final mo-
ments, since it contrasts with the newspaper coverage yet aligns with traditional “last 
words” accounts. For more on Plummer, see Michael C. Cohen.
75. My formulation of posthuman agency owes much to Jane Bennett’s theorization 
of matter as “vital” and agency as distributed across human and nonhuman actors in 
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, 2010). Yet the posthuman view of 
agency I am arguing for here, which includes but is not limited to individual agency, 
retains the link between agency and subjectivity that Sharon Krause has argued is nec-
essary for democratic politics: “In denying the link between agency and a subjectivity 
that is reflexive and individuated, albeit not sovereign, the new materialism threatens to 
eviscerate the grounds for holding persons responsible. Consequently, it cannot sustain 
a model of agency that is viable for democratic politics” (“Bodies in Action: Corporeal 
Agency and Democratic Politics,” Political Theory 39, vol. 3 [2011]: 299–324, 317).
76. The State Gazette of South Carolina LV, no. 4242 (12 August 1793): 2, col. 4; “Account.” 
77. Viewed this way, the “post”- human is not “after” or “beyond” the human. The 
posthuman is better understood as “between” the human and the nonhuman; it is the 
mediation that makes possible both the human/nonhuman distinction and the agency 
that exceeds these categories both ontologically and historically.
78. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 138. 
79. Rita Felski’s understanding of text as “a fellow actor and co- creator of relations, 
attitudes, and attachments” productively dismantles the static figuration of the artist as 
“a self- authorizing subject, an independent agent who summons up actions and orches-
trates events” (“Context Stinks!,” New Literary History 42, vol. 4 [2011]: 573–91, 583, 590). 
But rather than renouncing the aesthetic as a result, Felski instead rightly points out that 
the distinctiveness of art “does not rule out connectedness but is the very reason that con-
nections are forged and sustained” (584). 
80. Felski, 574.
81. See Johnson; and White and Drexler.
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